the morning of January 1 at 12.00 we are waiting at the Gran Caffè di Cava de 'Tirreni, Piazza Duomo, to exchange best wishes for the new year .
Let's hope ALL THE BEST!
Tuesday, December 30, 2008
Fun Facts Triple X Syndrome
Israelis and Palestinians are doomed to talk
Conversation of the Limes with Menachem Klein, professor of political science at Bar Ilan University and a signatory of the Geneva Accords of 2003.
LIMES: Professor Klein, as Israel lives its 60th anniversary?
KLEIN: With a mixture of anguish and resignation, the feeling of perpetual anxiety about encirclement, of hostility that comes from around its geographic resignation to the seeming immutability of this situation, that sixty years of wars and failed negotiations have failed to change. The economy is good, the Israeli army, although the evidence is not brilliant in recent times, remains the strongest in the region, but the country is frustrated, disillusioned, fatalistic: it is both his ruling elite that his public and this probably represents the main obstacle to peace.
LIMES: In what sense?
KLEIN: In that sense, today, the Israeli problem is not so much in the conduct of Olmert, as in the crisis of legitimacy which complicates the recent scandals, invests his government and his character, making it impossible to "sell" to the public any concessions, even modestly, to the other party. What's worse is that the same situation is reproduced in the Palestinian camp, where Abbas's popularity is at historic lows, mainly because of the manifest inability to force Israel to negotiate. So, at this juncture that Olmert and Abbas are essentially irrelevant, is to count their image among their electorates, and that image could not be worse. But that, unfortunately, is only the first problem.
LIMES: What are the others?
KLEIN: There Meanwhile, the gulf between the claims of Israeli and Palestinian negotiating. There is currently no text, no map on which the two parties can enter into dialogue. Veterans from previous repeated failures, no one has any illusions of being able to reach a detailed agreement soon. Notwithstanding this common dose of realism, their positions seem antithetical. Palestinians point to a workable agreement immediately, which provides for the return of Israel to the 1967 borders and the principle of "equal compensation," according to which each square meter of land built by Israel notwithstanding that boundary, must be offset with similar territorial concessions in favor of the future Palestinian state. Israel, by contrast, pursues the delaying tactics already experimented with the U.S. road map: points, that is, a mere declaration of intent, not binding on either party and therefore can be safely ignored.
LIMES: And the United States, historians mediators of contention?
KLEIN: This is the third critical element. It is clear that, at this juncture, Bush is not interested in resolving the conflict, but rather merely a "routine management" that minimizes, as far as possible damage. Thus, the objective of a Palestinian state with territorial continuously increased at the White House modest goal of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. They weigh up this attitude, the approach of presidential elections and the previous failure of Clinton, from which his successor should have drawn the belief that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is insoluble, which apply not worth that much. LIMES: What consequences produces everything on the prospects for an agreement?
KLEIN: The most immediate consequence, in the eyes of all, is a complete stalemate in the peace process. This is because, thanks to the U.S. benign neglect, Israel is left essentially free to dictate timing, manner and object of negotiation. That is, of sabotage the negotiations. In perspective, this situation encourages the radicalization of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, whose positions tend to become progressively more intransigent: a script, unfortunately, already visto.Il greatest danger, however, is the growing imbalance of power between the two parties in the field. Currently, there are about 500 Israeli roadblocks in the territories, while the settlements have never ceased to expand. A recent World Bank study showed that, despite the $ 7.2 billion in aid donated by the Paris Conference, the Palestinian economy "grows" -2% per year. Negative growth that would plunge to -7% for international aid should cease.
LIMES: The division of the territories stifles the Palestinian economy, which in turn feeds the exasperation of the public. Restore a minimum of Palestinian territorial continuity in space: this is therefore a priority?
KLEIN: Yes, in case the removal of the blocks has been the leitmotif of many - as unsuccessful - calls made by the Secretary of State Rice to the government in Jerusalem.
The problem is that this widespread system of territorial control is an integral part of the security of Israel, set up with the belief that the Palestinians are not able to control its territory, even if they were enabled to do so. From here to consider every Palestinian is a potential suspect, a short step. So much so that, on average, between 8 and 11 thousand Palestinians constantly crowded Israeli jails. It follows that, at present, the Palestinian leadership is a fake, because he is unable to perform many functions of government that constitute the exercise of real sovereignty. Palestine is, in effect, an Israeli protectorate.
LIMES: But why should Israel be interested in changing the status quo, if that makes a game with its own interests?
KLEIN : Why this disproportion of forces, pursued by Israel in the name of national security, could backfire. In ten years, under the current demographic trends, the Palestinians will be a numerical majority, not only in the territories, but even within the Jewish state. Which will cease to be such or lose its character as an ethnic state, staunchly defended by the Israeli leadership. The result may be the Balkanization of Israel, two ethnic groups that fight under the same flag, with the aggravating circumstance that the numerical majority ethnic group, the Arab will to submit to a system of rules designed to exclude and to facilitate the 'ethnic Jewish. The only alternative to this disastrous scenario is the two-state solution, with a return to 1967 borders of Israel. The question is not whether there will be, but when: close but not least, given that most delaying the peace, the greater the resentment that intossicherà future relations between the two neighbors.
LIMES: Sooner or later Israel will have therefore resolved to deal with Hamas, with a view to hand over the keys to the future Palestinian state. Considers this an acceptable way?
KLEIN: On Hamas my point of view differs essentially from that of many observers. From the sensational election victory of 2006, I took the trouble of analyzing the documents of the organization and I realized that it is far more pragmatic than Israel, the West and its own propaganda claims the paint. Officially, Hamas does not renounce its guiding principles: it is reluctant to sign an agreement with Israel, because that would involve the full recognition of the Jewish state and still claim the full return of refugees. However, since the force of government, it has the same problem with all the other political formations operating in a representative government: to win public acceptance. If it accepts a peace agreement, Hamas will have to do the same, changing the attitude of total closure to Israel and the United States. So I think it is essential to submit any agreement to a vote of Israelis and Palestinians face a yes of the two electorates, their political leaders no longer have excuses.
LIMES: If Hamas is so pragmatic, why does not seem particularly interested in maintaining the hudna (truce) agreement signed with Israel?
KLEIN: Because of the terms are not negotiable items that it is extending the ceasefire to the West Bank. Which, of course, Israel is not willing to grant, as to undermine the basis of its security system.
LIMES: Do you believe that the liberation Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah leader currently imprisoned in Israel, can facilitate a constructive dialogue?
KLEIN: Yes, even if Jerusalem should be fully aware of the potential consequences of this act. In two years, Palestine will return to the polls for the second presidential vote in its history. In the event of a release of Barghouti, the odds that Fatah wins the election are quite high, because the current president, Abbas has already announced that it did not wish to reapply. Israel is prepared to deal with a charismatic leader that sparked the intifada two and is still regarded by Israeli intelligence like a public enemy? Freeing Barghouti involves recognizing the Palestinian counterparts, for whatever the leader, equal dignity to the negotiating table. I'd be the first to rejoice over such a development.
LIMES: Without taking anything away from his optimism about the influence of democracy on the attitude of the Palestinian leadership, but there is another unknown factor that weighs on the future of the negotiations with Iran. This is seen by many as the real long-term opponent of Israel and the far more dangerous.
KLEIN: This is what I think also part of the Israeli establishment, which has long been intense debate about what priorities should be policy of Israel. Some believe need to focus on the Palestinian issue and who, by contrast, sees in Iran an existential threat. Threat, however, can not be addressed simultaneously with the Palestinians, given that Jerusalem is not in a position to fight on two fronts. Therefore, according to the proponents of this view, Israel should give Hamas just enough to appease, to then have a free hand against Tehran.
LIMES: Do you share this vision?
KLEIN: Absolutely not. Frankly, I prefer to leave aside the large regional scenarios in favor of a "local", but perhaps less striking, I think, more realistic. I'm not saying that the regional context has its own importance, but the heart of the Middle East remains the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the heart of this conflict are, in fact, Israel and Palestine. The Israelis certainly would gain peace of mind if the Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad is not constantly threatened to obliterate Israel off the map, but this takes away their sleep is the presence on their borders, a hostile population, fell into a state of chaos and chronic underdevelopment. For their part, the Palestinians can rejoice to know the "Arab brothers" on their side, but then with the Israeli roadblocks and the endemic poverty they have to do daily accounts. This is to occupy the minds and lives of Israelis and Palestinians, rather than the attitude of Tehran.
LIMES: Maybe, but the fact remains that Israel suffers a small area which makes it an easy target for hostile acts and potentially devastating, like the Qassam rockets that rain down from Lebanon on a regular basis. It is known that Syria is behind Hezbollah, behind which, in turn, you can see the shadow of Tehran. And so we return to the starting point.
KLEIN: There is no doubt that Lebanon is a serious threat to Israeli security. But the combination of Hizbullah-Syria, with the inevitable Appendix Iran does not do justice to the complexity of the situation. At the base of which is not so much the long arm of Iran, as a spray of terrorist groups due, once again, the Israeli strategy. Weaken the Palestinian leadership to reduce it to impotence, Jerusalem has made it the de facto uncontrollable myriad of armed factions that often do not meet with Hamas nor Fatah. A galaxy of terrorist factions more or less related to jihad, which in many cases acting individually, in a logic that we define the "guerrilla DIY. Today, this is Israel's strategic nightmare.
LIMES: What , then, is the recipe to break the stalemate? What do you think can and should be the role of the future American administration?
KLEIN: There is no simple solution to a complex problem like this. If, as we said, the rock is above that of the current leadership, much will depend on upcoming Palestinian elections and the evolution of complex political situation in Israel. Surely I do not expect that the next U.S. administration, whatever it is, plays a crucial role. Beyond the attitude of the current administration, Israel must stop believing that America is willing to spend to impose what Israelis and Palestinians that is good for them. From the perspective of the Washington Arab-Israeli conflict, as important, it remains an assumption of foreign policy, in which the White House will only do their interests. Who, when, basically consist in perpetuating the imbalance of forces in favor of Israel, with all the implications that, in perspective, this entails. LIMES: She was among the architects of the Geneva Agreement of 2003. He believes that experience will serve again?
KLEIN: The negotiations in Geneva has demonstrated that, technically, a peace agreement is possible. It did not produce peace, it is true, but it has developed a negotiation technique - composition negotiating team, methods for conducting the negotiations, the choice of subjects to be given priority and identification of potential meeting points on the more controversial - that, to date, is still valid. Put it to good use, however, depends on us. 
Conversation of the Limes with Menachem Klein, professor of political science at Bar Ilan University and a signatory of the Geneva Accords of 2003.
LIMES: Professor Klein, as Israel lives its 60th anniversary?
KLEIN: With a mixture of anguish and resignation, the feeling of perpetual anxiety about encirclement, of hostility that comes from around its geographic resignation to the seeming immutability of this situation, that sixty years of wars and failed negotiations have failed to change. The economy is good, the Israeli army, although the evidence is not brilliant in recent times, remains the strongest in the region, but the country is frustrated, disillusioned, fatalistic: it is both his ruling elite that his public and this probably represents the main obstacle to peace.
LIMES: In what sense?
KLEIN: In that sense, today, the Israeli problem is not so much in the conduct of Olmert, as in the crisis of legitimacy which complicates the recent scandals, invests his government and his character, making it impossible to "sell" to the public any concessions, even modestly, to the other party. What's worse is that the same situation is reproduced in the Palestinian camp, where Abbas's popularity is at historic lows, mainly because of the manifest inability to force Israel to negotiate. So, at this juncture that Olmert and Abbas are essentially irrelevant, is to count their image among their electorates, and that image could not be worse. But that, unfortunately, is only the first problem.
LIMES: What are the others?
KLEIN: There Meanwhile, the gulf between the claims of Israeli and Palestinian negotiating. There is currently no text, no map on which the two parties can enter into dialogue. Veterans from previous repeated failures, no one has any illusions of being able to reach a detailed agreement soon. Notwithstanding this common dose of realism, their positions seem antithetical. Palestinians point to a workable agreement immediately, which provides for the return of Israel to the 1967 borders and the principle of "equal compensation," according to which each square meter of land built by Israel notwithstanding that boundary, must be offset with similar territorial concessions in favor of the future Palestinian state. Israel, by contrast, pursues the delaying tactics already experimented with the U.S. road map: points, that is, a mere declaration of intent, not binding on either party and therefore can be safely ignored.
LIMES: And the United States, historians mediators of contention?
KLEIN: This is the third critical element. It is clear that, at this juncture, Bush is not interested in resolving the conflict, but rather merely a "routine management" that minimizes, as far as possible damage. Thus, the objective of a Palestinian state with territorial continuously increased at the White House modest goal of a Palestinian state with provisional borders. They weigh up this attitude, the approach of presidential elections and the previous failure of Clinton, from which his successor should have drawn the belief that the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is insoluble, which apply not worth that much. LIMES: What consequences produces everything on the prospects for an agreement?
KLEIN: The most immediate consequence, in the eyes of all, is a complete stalemate in the peace process. This is because, thanks to the U.S. benign neglect, Israel is left essentially free to dictate timing, manner and object of negotiation. That is, of sabotage the negotiations. In perspective, this situation encourages the radicalization of Israeli and Palestinian public opinion, whose positions tend to become progressively more intransigent: a script, unfortunately, already visto.Il greatest danger, however, is the growing imbalance of power between the two parties in the field. Currently, there are about 500 Israeli roadblocks in the territories, while the settlements have never ceased to expand. A recent World Bank study showed that, despite the $ 7.2 billion in aid donated by the Paris Conference, the Palestinian economy "grows" -2% per year. Negative growth that would plunge to -7% for international aid should cease.
LIMES: The division of the territories stifles the Palestinian economy, which in turn feeds the exasperation of the public. Restore a minimum of Palestinian territorial continuity in space: this is therefore a priority?
KLEIN: Yes, in case the removal of the blocks has been the leitmotif of many - as unsuccessful - calls made by the Secretary of State Rice to the government in Jerusalem.
The problem is that this widespread system of territorial control is an integral part of the security of Israel, set up with the belief that the Palestinians are not able to control its territory, even if they were enabled to do so. From here to consider every Palestinian is a potential suspect, a short step. So much so that, on average, between 8 and 11 thousand Palestinians constantly crowded Israeli jails. It follows that, at present, the Palestinian leadership is a fake, because he is unable to perform many functions of government that constitute the exercise of real sovereignty. Palestine is, in effect, an Israeli protectorate.
LIMES: But why should Israel be interested in changing the status quo, if that makes a game with its own interests?
KLEIN : Why this disproportion of forces, pursued by Israel in the name of national security, could backfire. In ten years, under the current demographic trends, the Palestinians will be a numerical majority, not only in the territories, but even within the Jewish state. Which will cease to be such or lose its character as an ethnic state, staunchly defended by the Israeli leadership. The result may be the Balkanization of Israel, two ethnic groups that fight under the same flag, with the aggravating circumstance that the numerical majority ethnic group, the Arab will to submit to a system of rules designed to exclude and to facilitate the 'ethnic Jewish. The only alternative to this disastrous scenario is the two-state solution, with a return to 1967 borders of Israel. The question is not whether there will be, but when: close but not least, given that most delaying the peace, the greater the resentment that intossicherà future relations between the two neighbors.
LIMES: Sooner or later Israel will have therefore resolved to deal with Hamas, with a view to hand over the keys to the future Palestinian state. Considers this an acceptable way?
KLEIN: On Hamas my point of view differs essentially from that of many observers. From the sensational election victory of 2006, I took the trouble of analyzing the documents of the organization and I realized that it is far more pragmatic than Israel, the West and its own propaganda claims the paint. Officially, Hamas does not renounce its guiding principles: it is reluctant to sign an agreement with Israel, because that would involve the full recognition of the Jewish state and still claim the full return of refugees. However, since the force of government, it has the same problem with all the other political formations operating in a representative government: to win public acceptance. If it accepts a peace agreement, Hamas will have to do the same, changing the attitude of total closure to Israel and the United States. So I think it is essential to submit any agreement to a vote of Israelis and Palestinians face a yes of the two electorates, their political leaders no longer have excuses.
LIMES: If Hamas is so pragmatic, why does not seem particularly interested in maintaining the hudna (truce) agreement signed with Israel?
KLEIN: Because of the terms are not negotiable items that it is extending the ceasefire to the West Bank. Which, of course, Israel is not willing to grant, as to undermine the basis of its security system.
LIMES: Do you believe that the liberation Marwan Barghouti, the Fatah leader currently imprisoned in Israel, can facilitate a constructive dialogue?
KLEIN: Yes, even if Jerusalem should be fully aware of the potential consequences of this act. In two years, Palestine will return to the polls for the second presidential vote in its history. In the event of a release of Barghouti, the odds that Fatah wins the election are quite high, because the current president, Abbas has already announced that it did not wish to reapply. Israel is prepared to deal with a charismatic leader that sparked the intifada two and is still regarded by Israeli intelligence like a public enemy? Freeing Barghouti involves recognizing the Palestinian counterparts, for whatever the leader, equal dignity to the negotiating table. I'd be the first to rejoice over such a development.
LIMES: Without taking anything away from his optimism about the influence of democracy on the attitude of the Palestinian leadership, but there is another unknown factor that weighs on the future of the negotiations with Iran. This is seen by many as the real long-term opponent of Israel and the far more dangerous.
KLEIN: This is what I think also part of the Israeli establishment, which has long been intense debate about what priorities should be policy of Israel. Some believe need to focus on the Palestinian issue and who, by contrast, sees in Iran an existential threat. Threat, however, can not be addressed simultaneously with the Palestinians, given that Jerusalem is not in a position to fight on two fronts. Therefore, according to the proponents of this view, Israel should give Hamas just enough to appease, to then have a free hand against Tehran.
LIMES: Do you share this vision?
KLEIN: Absolutely not. Frankly, I prefer to leave aside the large regional scenarios in favor of a "local", but perhaps less striking, I think, more realistic. I'm not saying that the regional context has its own importance, but the heart of the Middle East remains the Israeli-Palestinian conflict and the heart of this conflict are, in fact, Israel and Palestine. The Israelis certainly would gain peace of mind if the Iranian President Ahmadi-Nejad is not constantly threatened to obliterate Israel off the map, but this takes away their sleep is the presence on their borders, a hostile population, fell into a state of chaos and chronic underdevelopment. For their part, the Palestinians can rejoice to know the "Arab brothers" on their side, but then with the Israeli roadblocks and the endemic poverty they have to do daily accounts. This is to occupy the minds and lives of Israelis and Palestinians, rather than the attitude of Tehran.
LIMES: Maybe, but the fact remains that Israel suffers a small area which makes it an easy target for hostile acts and potentially devastating, like the Qassam rockets that rain down from Lebanon on a regular basis. It is known that Syria is behind Hezbollah, behind which, in turn, you can see the shadow of Tehran. And so we return to the starting point.
KLEIN: There is no doubt that Lebanon is a serious threat to Israeli security. But the combination of Hizbullah-Syria, with the inevitable Appendix Iran does not do justice to the complexity of the situation. At the base of which is not so much the long arm of Iran, as a spray of terrorist groups due, once again, the Israeli strategy. Weaken the Palestinian leadership to reduce it to impotence, Jerusalem has made it the de facto uncontrollable myriad of armed factions that often do not meet with Hamas nor Fatah. A galaxy of terrorist factions more or less related to jihad, which in many cases acting individually, in a logic that we define the "guerrilla DIY. Today, this is Israel's strategic nightmare.
LIMES: What , then, is the recipe to break the stalemate? What do you think can and should be the role of the future American administration?
KLEIN: There is no simple solution to a complex problem like this. If, as we said, the rock is above that of the current leadership, much will depend on upcoming Palestinian elections and the evolution of complex political situation in Israel. Surely I do not expect that the next U.S. administration, whatever it is, plays a crucial role. Beyond the attitude of the current administration, Israel must stop believing that America is willing to spend to impose what Israelis and Palestinians that is good for them. From the perspective of the Washington Arab-Israeli conflict, as important, it remains an assumption of foreign policy, in which the White House will only do their interests. Who, when, basically consist in perpetuating the imbalance of forces in favor of Israel, with all the implications that, in perspective, this entails. LIMES: She was among the architects of the Geneva Agreement of 2003. He believes that experience will serve again?
KLEIN: The negotiations in Geneva has demonstrated that, technically, a peace agreement is possible. It did not produce peace, it is true, but it has developed a negotiation technique - composition negotiating team, methods for conducting the negotiations, the choice of subjects to be given priority and identification of potential meeting points on the more controversial - that, to date, is still valid. Put it to good use, however, depends on us.
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